The increasing risks that subprime lenders have been willing to take have culminated in a debacle of rising foreclosures. So far, however, subprime defaults and foreclosures are lower than they were about five years ago, and the problem is likely to be confined to the subprime market, rather than the conventional mortgage market or the US economy. Extensive public and private efforts are being made to mitigate the problem. In addition, despite popular consensus to the contrary, house prices in general have not fallen over the past year, and few markets are experiencing a substantial decline. Lenders and regulators are both taking action to reform subprime lending, and the foreclosure problem is likely to be limited to the 2004-2006 ledgers of business. Meanwhile, there has been a long-term homeownership boom, extending broadly across American society and including minority groups with high immigration rates. This boom has been facilitated by the revolution in information technology, making it possible for lenders to measure risk more accurately, and by the growth of financial literacy initiatives and counseling. For these reasons, the subprime foreclosure problem is likely to be shortterm. Looking at individual markets, many areas in Indiana, Michigan and Ohio are having serious problems, though there are some grounds for hope that they will not experience the worst of the subprime debacle.
The Long and Short of Housing: The Homeownership Boom and the Subprime Foreclosure Bust Subprime mortgages dominate the economic news. They have pushed $3-agallon gas off the front pages, and completely obscured the 4.5 percent national unemployment rate, and the economic expansion that has now lasted 5 ½ years and is the fourth longest expansion since World War II.
The common view seems to be that the sky is falling -or perhaps, to use a housing metaphor, the roof is falling in -not just in the subprime market, or the housing sector, but the entire U.S. economy and even the world. In this paper, I intend to put the subprime mortgage problem in perspective. As the same time, I do not at all intend to minimize the problem, for policymakers, lenders, and especially for subprime borrowers, many of whom apparently have been persuaded to take on highly leveraged debt instruments without having the possible consequences explained to them.
My focus is national, but I will conclude with some discussion of the local situation and outlook, in Indiana and the Midwest.
The Subprime Market: Growth and Change
The subprime market is new, and it has grown very fast. It barely existed 20 years ago; now, it constitutes about 15 percent of the home mortgage market, and may have accounted for 20 percent of home mortgage originations last year.
This dramatic growth appears to stem from three public policy changes.
First, the 1986 Tax Reform Act ended the federal income tax deductibility of consumer interest for all purposes except home mortgages. This adversely affected the market for consumer loans, and spurred the growth of home equity lending, particularly in the form of HELOCs (home equity lines of credit). Consumer lenders, seeing their traditional market drying up, began moving into home equity lending.
Second, and I think most important, was the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) , in the aftermath of the savings and loan collapse. FIRREA not only provided the funds and institutional arrangements for closing many failed S&Ls, it also established a new regulatory framework for the surviving institutions. In particular, it set higher capital standards for home mortgages held in portfolio, for both traditional home mortgage lenders and commercial banks; and it required more stringent regulation and supervision of mortgage lenders by the financial regulatory agencies. After FIRREA, the traditional mortgage lenders and also banks often found it more profitable to operate as mortgage bankers -originating mortgages, but not keeping them in portfolio, selling them instead into the secondary market, usually to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. As portfolio lenders, S&LS were able to adopt their own underwriting standards, within statutory and regulatory limits. As mortgage bankers, they perforce had to meet the GSEs' less flexible standards in order to sell or securitize their mortgages. Also, as local institutions, they were in a position to consider special circumstances for individual loans and borrowers. In the aftermath of the collapse, the surviving institutions tended to become regional and national, giving loan officers less room for local decision. And of course loans to risky borrowers in a bank's portfolio did not appeal to regulators. As the traditional lenders therefore moved away from making relatively risky loans, they left an opportunity for the consumer lenders.
The third policy was more amorphous: federal encouragement of a conventional mortgage-backed securities market. For many years the financial markets were only willing to accept MBS with an explicit or implicit federal guarantee. Market acceptance of MBS backed by conventional mortgages and issued by fully private institutions came slowly, but by the late 1980s conventional MBS were being successfully issued. During the early 1990s, subprime MBS were beginning to earn market acceptance.
Each policy served important public purposes. Taken together, they had the unintended consequence of facilitating the subprime mortgage market. From $3 billion in subprime mortgages in 1988, as best the market could be measured, originations increased to $38 billion in 1996 and then to over $500 billion by 2004.
Equally important, as the market grew, subprime lending changed. In the mid1990s I wrote the first systematic academic study of the subprime market, at the behest of a group of subprime lenders who had formed a nascent trade association.
1 At that time, subprime loans were basically either refinances or debt consolidation, often first mortgages for people who already owned their homes, free and clear. Fewer than five percent were purchase money mortgages. In addition, LTVs on subprime loans were substantially lower than in the conventional prime market for home purchase loans, typically no more than 70 percent. Subprime lenders knew they were taking a great deal of risk, and they wanted protection against loss, as much as possible. Even at such low LTVs, subprime lenders typically lost about 30 cents on the dollar when they foreclosed, took title, and sold the home. to be higher over the next couple of years than they were at the beginning of the decade.
The point is that we have had similar experiences; the current situation is different in degree, not in kind.
Also, and this is probably more important than the precise levels of subprime defaults and foreclosures, there was no similar pattern -no echo of the subprime spikein the prime market. Delinquencies and especially foreclosures on prime mortgages remained low during the previous subprime debacle.
These charts suggest to me that the current problem is likely to be limited to the subprime market. It is not likely to be contagious and infect the prime market, although some prime lenders, and especially Wall Street analysts and the media, are expressing the opposite view. at all, I have translated these cumulative default rates into annual rates over the next three to four years, amounting to about 500,000 to 600,00 homeowners each year.
To put these projections into the context of Chart 2, the lower numbers represent a quarterly rate of about 1.5 percent for loans entering foreclosure, and the higher numbers about 2.5 percent.
The outcome is likely to be somewhere in between. In my view, it is likely to be closer to the MBA projection, for reasons discussed in the remainder of the paper. But, either way or anywhere in between, it seems unlikely that annual foreclosures of 200,000 to 600,000 subprime loans are likely to threaten a disaster for the US economy, let alone the world.
Mitigating the Impact of Subprime Foreclosures: Forbearance
Public policies are also affecting lenders' treatment of delinquent borrowers. The practice of forbearance is growing, encouraged by government agencies and the GSEs. Conventional lenders apparently have a generally similar experience. It appears that somewhat more than half of conventional borrowers with forbearance are current within a year, perhaps about 60 percent. This appears to be the case for both prime loans sold to the GSEs, and subprime loans as well. As the subprime problem has worsened, the financial regulators have been encouraging forbearance. Their joint statement in April encouraged lenders who are financial institutions "to work constructively" with homeowners who cannot make their mortgage payments, particularly borrowers subprime ARMs, and to "consider prudent workout arrangements that increase the potential for financially stressed residential borrowers to keep their homes." The guidance also recommended counseling, including specific programs, and suggested that instituions could receive "favorable Community
Reinvestment Act consideration for programs that transition low and moderate income borrowers from higher cost loans to lower cost loans."
6 These efforts and policies are contributing to preventing foreclosures and helping families remain in their homes.
Mitigating the Impact of Subprime Foreclosures: House Prices
In addition, the underlying economic trends are favorable to homeowners. This may seem a surprising statement when housing starts have fallen by one-third in a yearthe sharpest one-year drop since the Census Bureau began publishing monthly data in 1959. In addition, interest rates have been rising. But housing starts and interest rates are notorious cyclical. A more meaningful indicator is house prices.
Before "subprime mortgages" captured the headlines, the hot topic in housing was the "housing bubble," with numerous comparisons to the This is not accurate. Economic "bubbles" are changes in asset prices: a rapid increase in asset prices followed immediately by a sharp fall in asset prices.
The best house price data is the House Price Index produced by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO). This is a repeat sales price index, measuring changes in price for the same house from one sale to the next. As financial safety and soundness regulator of the GSEs, OFHEO has the records of millions of loans purchased by the GSEs, going back more than 30 years. These records enable OFHEO to compute national, regional and metropolitan price indexes dating back to 1975.
During those 30 years, there has been a steady upward trend in house prices, and that trend is still continuing, as Chart 4 shows. There have been price increases in 117 out of 125 quarters, including every quarter since 1993.
What has happened recently is that the rate of price increase has decelerated, very
sharply. During 2004 During -2005 , prices increased at double-digit rates. Over the last four quarters, ending in the first quarter of 2007, the rate of increase has been only about four percent. That is a much lower increase, but still an increase.
It is an odd sort of bubble, with prices still rising.
One reason for the common belief that the bubble has burst is that people do not bother to define "bubble," or to quantify it. What does a bubble actually look like?
The By this definition, FDIC has identified ten boom/bust cycles -ten "bubbles" or "slow leaks" during 1978-1998: four in southern California, one in Honolulu, five in New
England. This is out of 280 markets over a 20-year period. FDIC has also split the cyclical pattern between the upward and downward phases to identify boom and bust periods. Over those 20 years, there were 59 booms and 26 busts. As these data show, most booms were not followed by busts. But very few markets have experienced a "slow leak" over a period as long as a year (a price decline of 3.2 percent or more) -only ten: eight in California, one in Nevada, and one in Florida. The only large metropolitan area is Sacramento. The largest decline is in Punta Gorda, Florida, at 4.57 percent during the year (after a 95 percent increase in the previous four years); if that rate of decrease were to continue for another two and a half years, Punta Gorda would qualify as a boom/bust cycle -a bubble.
Over more than a year, there are only four markets on course for a bust: Santa Barbara, Kokomo, Anderson, and Sacramento. Kokomo had the worst decline in prices during 2006, followed by a slight increase in the first quarter of 2007.
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Besides the imprecision with which we quantify bubbles, I think there is another reason why people generally believe the housing bubble has burst. We appear to be seeing an "expectations bubble." Expecting prices to keep rising, sellers set asking prices that turned out to be unrealistic. They have had to cut their asking prices. However, they are still typically able to sell the house for more than they paid for it, just not as much more as they expected and hoped. and Budget, Congress (especially but not exclusively members of the opposite party), and the media.
It is important to distinguish these efforts from traditional "financial literacy" education programs for high school students, often considered to be ineffective. 20 One reason is that high school students do not face significant real financial decisions. Most of the federal and private programs are aimed at adults, for whom the issues are real and often immediate. There is some reason to believe that these programs are more effective.
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Probably the most immediately relevant activity is counseling. Hundreds of organizations around the country provide counseling for families that are making decisions about housing: whether to buy, what to do when they have problems, how to react to actions by their landlord, etc. (Counselors tend to focus primarily on buying a home, since that is the largest financial decision most families ever make, but they also provide information and advice about keeping a home when the owner gets into financial difficulties, and thus are helping to mitigate the current subprime foreclosure problem.)
HUD has a list of approved counseling agencies, which is not intended as an exhaustive list. The HUD list includes 50 agencies in Indiana, 10 of them in Indianapolis.
HUD also provides funds to counseling agencies. In 2006 these HUD-funded agencies provided counseling to over 1.5 million individuals and families, including about 175,000 with mortgage delinquency problems. 
A longer view: the homeownership boom
It is useful to step back from the current concerns about subprime mortgages and housing bubbles and consider some fundamental phenomena that are more important in the longer term and give some context to the headlines of today and recent years.
The most important is the remarkable growth in homeownership. As Chart 6
shows, the homeownership rate among American households has been rising strongly for more than a decade. The record homeownership is 69.2 percent of all households in the fourth quarter of 2004. The rate has remained close to that level until this year, declining to 68.2 percent in the second quarter. Even with this recent decline, the homeownership rate is up by about 4-5 percentage points of the population over 10-12 years. That represents about five million households. This has been the largest increase for any decade since right after World War II.
Homeownership has also been increasing for minority groups, and has also been setting records. Chart 6 shows the homeownership rates for African-Americans and Hispanic Americans since 1994 (the earliest date for which annual and quarterly data are available). It is not explicit on these charts, but obviously there is a marked disparity between whites and minority households. The homeownership rate for whites is about 75 percent, while that for minority households as a whole is about 50 percent (75.4 percent and 50.8 percent, respectively, in the second quarter). The rate is below 50 percent for African-Americans, and just at 50 percent for Hispanic Americans. As Chart 6 shows, the rate for Hispanic households has recently passed that for African-Americans. It has risen by about eight percentage points since 1994. This is impressive and unexpected, given the high rate of Hispanic immigration.
Immigrants have not typically bought homes shortly after they arrive in this country.
Rapid immigration would normally be pulling the homeownership rate down. Instead, even though the number of immigrants has grown dramatically, the number of homeowners has grown faster. In the last 10 years, the number of Hispanic households has increased by 4 million, almost 50 percent more than the 8.6 million in the second quarter of 1997. At the same time, the number of Hispanic homeowners has increased by 2.6 million, about 70 percent more than the 3.7 million ten years ago. A similar pattern holds for the Census Bureau's residual category of "other" households, which has also been rapidly increasing. This category consists primarily of Asian-Americans, though it also includes Native Americans and some smaller groups. Since the beginning of 2003, when consistent data become available, the number of "other" households has risen by 725,000, a 17 percent increase, while the number of "other" homeowners has increased by 600,000, and 25 percent increase, and the "other" homeownership rate has risen from 56.6 percent to 60.6 percent. 
The Information Revolution Comes to the Mortgage Market
The desire for homeownership has always been strong. The National Association of Home Builders likes to say that "owning your own home is the American dream," and NAHB is right. Given this strong and long-established preference, why has the homeownership rate increased so much in recent years?
The most important reason is technology. As the information revolution has permeated the housing market and the mortgage market, lenders have been much better 24 In the first quarter of 2003 the Census began reporting a category of "two or more races." The number of households reported as "other" dropped by 511,000 from the fourth quarter of 2002, almost 11 percent. We did not have credit histories 15-20 years ago. Now we have credit histories summarized in FICO scores, and we know that credit history is a better predictor of default than initial LTV. Credit histories distinguish prime from subprime borrowers.
We also have automated underwriting systems which combine the information about the borrower and the home and the mortgage and enable the lender to make a fast decision on the loan application. We did not have this technology 15-20 years ago.
FHA, which of course has long served higher-risk borrowers than conventional lenders, has developed the TOTAL Scorecard (Technology Open To All Lenders), an algorithm to assess risk, and tell lenders whether a given loan will be automatically insured by FHA, or whether it must be manually underwritten. (It is not politically acceptable to deny FHA insurance on the basis of a statistical procedure without appeal to human judgment. Partly for that reason, FHA has not used FICO scores in approving loans.) TOTAL is not an automated underwriting system, but rather an algorithm that can be used as part of a lender's own AUS. With TOTAL, FHA can do a better job of evaluating risk at the high-risk end of its market; it can tell who is a "good high-risk" and who is a "bad high-risk" borrower. FHA can therefore move farther down in the risk spectrum, and also farther down in the income distribution, and serve more minority households.
Subprime lenders also have taken advantage of the new technology. And as Charts 1-3 show, they have used that technology to take more risk, and indeed have sometimes overshot their ability to measure risk. When I wrote my book about subprime lenders in the mid-1990s, the annualized foreclosure rate for subprime loans was 3.1 percent. Now it is 10.8 percent, according to the MBA, and perhaps rising, according to the Center for Responsible Lending's projection.
The National Conclusion: The Subprime Debacle in Perspective
The rise in subprime foreclosures is real and likely to be large. Many homebuyers will find themselves in over their head, with loans whose terms they do not really understand. Whether the number of foreclosures turns out to be 200,000 per year or 600,000 per year, these are real families who are losing their homes, and their savings.
For them, it is a disaster; for the housing sector, it is a debacle.
From a policy standpoint, this serious problem is probably a short-term problem, mainly limited to subprime mortgages originated during [2004] [2005] [2006] . It will be mitigated by public and private efforts to help the families in distress. There is no reason for it to spread to the prime market. Homeowners who are able to make their payments are not going to put themselves in position to lose their homes because other homeowners are losing theirs.
Moreover, the short-term subprime debacle will be limited by the long-term fundamentals in the housing and mortgage markets: the strong demand for homeownership, facilitated by the new information technology and determined policy efforts. The roof is not caving in on housing, let alone on the US or world economy.
All Housing Markets are Local: Indiana and the Midwest
Turning from this broad national perspective, it is both sobering and encouraging to look at Indiana and nearby states. I am not an expert on the individual markets, but there are several national sources of comparative information about local markets and I have lived or worked in several Midwestern states.
This discussion focuses on Indiana, Michigan and Ohio, because there seems to be a marked difference between the markets in these states and the states west of Indiana. Finally, Table 5 reports the Center for Responsible Lending's projection of subprime foreclosures for loans originated in 2006. This is based on CRL's forecast of house prices, and the best guide to future price changes is past price changes, so CRL's projection should look somewhat like the OFHEO index for the past year. In fact, it is more encouraging than any of the others. There is only one Michigan city in the worst 25.
The worst in Indiana is again Kokomo, but only at #69; the worst in Ohio is Mansfield, at #97.
The current and the most backward-looking indicators suggest especially serious problems in Indiana, Michigan and Ohio; the more forward-looking indicators suggest that problems will be less serious.
The most obvious factor in these patterns is the American automobile industry.
Detroit's problems are well known. Flint has traditionally been known as "a Buick plant with a town around it." And in Indiana, Kokomo and Anderson bring to mind the problems of auto parts manufacturers Delco and Delphi. Many of the Ohio areas have specialized in autos or auto parts.
Beyond autos, these tend to be areas that have suffered consistently high unemployment rates, and they tend to be smaller areas, with narrower economies. They are generally places that have not participated in the housing boom, or the economic boom of recent years. But apparently they have not share in the wild and crazy subprime lending boom, either, so they may not suffer the worst of the debacle. 16.00 Q 1 . 1 9 9 8 Q 3 . 1 9 9 8 Q 1 . 1 9 9 9 Q 3 . 1 9 9 9 Q 1 . 
